As we all know, the chip is a business that needs to sit on the “cold bench”. Across the front is a technological gap that is difficult to catch up in the short term. Domestic chips have no innate advantages on the starting line, and there is no shortcut to make a move.
Recently, reports of unfinished chip projects have attracted attention. On October 20, Meng Wei, a spokesman for the National Development and Reform Commission, responded, “The enthusiasm for investing in the integrated circuit industry in China has continued to grow, and some ‘three no’ companies with no experience, no technology, and no talents have joined the integrated circuit industry. Insufficient understanding of the laws of circuit development, blindly launching projects, low-level repeated construction risks appear, and even some projects are stagnant and workshops are vacant, resulting in waste of resources.”
The supply of chips is cut off, which is urgent. With the two major Chinese communication equipment manufacturers ZTE and Huawei encountering the embargo of the United States one after another, the government, the market, and entrepreneurs are aware of China’s shortcomings in chips. At the same time, chips have repeatedly appeared in various top-level design documents. It has become a popular option for a new round of industrial construction, and it is not difficult to understand the enthusiasm for core making across the country.
It’s just that enthusiasm can’t make chips, and PPT can’t. Chip is a typical high-tech, capital-intensive industry with large investment and long cycle. The chip project tests the ability of excellent technology, investment and continuous financing. For a considerable number of local governments, the hard indicators of technology and capital are big tests. When some media reported these unfinished chip projects, they bluntly stated that some local governments with weaker financial capabilities underestimated the capital investment density of chip manufacturing projects, while overestimating local resources and social financing capabilities.
There is no diamond, no porcelain work. The issue of strength, to put it bluntly, is a matter of self-knowledge. The core-making project that has problems is most afraid of knowing that its own strength is insufficient and it is difficult to bridge the gap, but still “likes to hear” the core-making project, and regards it as a “good project” for making money.
The real core making should be sincere. This sincerity requires at least a coordinator with strong comprehensive business capabilities. If the local government wants to act as this coordinator, it must implement the top-level design and the basic projects one by one. The complex core-making project not only includes industrial park planning and land environmental impact assessment, but also involves systematic work such as talent transfer and training in research institutions, market environment incubation, industrial chain construction transition, and capital chain integrity and security.
Core making is a precious undertaking. Its preciousness lies in the fact that it is not good to be blind and arrogant, and it is not good to belittle oneself; It is necessary to leverage the market’s leverage, but it cannot completely rely on the nature of the market. It is necessary to have both the power of the government and a clear boundary with the government.
In most high-tech fields, China, as a latecomer to catch up, has extremely difficult so-called “independent innovation”. Therefore, in most cases, many fields follow a technical route of introduction, digestion and re-innovation. The key point is “how to acquire technology” and how to re-innovate.